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RICO, PAST AND FUTURE:
SOME OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Ilene H. Nagel*
Sheldon I. Plager *
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act-RICO-the
name, pretentious as it is, conveys the message.' As the Act itself says
in its statement of findings and purpose:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a
highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity . . . ; (2) or-
ganized crime derives a major portion of its power through money
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property . .. ; (3) this money and
power are increasingly used to infiltrate and to subvert and corrupt our
democratic processes ....
To the casual reader, images of the Godfather, Mafia meetings in the
hills of New Jersey, and Sicilian "families" corrupting and killing
might naturally come to mind. The less casual reader interested in the
legislative and pre-legislative history of RICO finds strong support for
the same images.
The pre-legislative history goes back to the Kefauver Committee of
1951, the American Bar Association's Commission on Organized
Crime, the McClellan Committee's hearings in the 1950's and early
1960's, and the Katzenbach Commission's comprehensive report in
1967. 3 These hearings and reports focused the nation's attention on the
activities of organized crime; gave substance to the terms "Mafia,"
"the syndicate," and "racketeer"; exposed criminal infiltration of la-
bor unions, business and government; and probably helped spawn the
plethora of gangbuster shows so popular in the early years of televi-
sion.
• Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law.
** Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law.
1. There is some question whether the words used in the name were intended to describe
the contents of the Act or a character in an early Edward G. Robinson movie. See Blakey, The
Rico Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237,
237 n.3 (1982).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970).
3. For a review of this history, see, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014 (1980).
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The legislative history of RICO amply demonstrates its parentage,
and the preoccupation of its sponsors with the syndicate, Mafia-spon-
sored criminal collusion, and the problem of the infiltration of legiti-
mate businesses by organized crime. 4 The act that emerged from this
concern was broad and sweeping. Its congressional sponsors were well
aware that, as drafted, the act could be construed as applying to
individuals and activities not associated with any criminal organiza-
tion. They felt, however, that there was no way to draw an effective
statute that would reach the array of commercial activity of organized
crime without also inadvertently including crimes commonly commit-
ted by persons outside organized crime. They felt that Congress had
done all it could.5 The Justice Department also recognized the prob-
lem, and had reassured Congress and the public that RICO would not
be used indiscriminately-"We're not going to power rape nickel and
dime cases. ''
As Webb and Turow indicate in their article, 7 federal prosecutors
were slow to invoke the various provisions of RICO. The novelty of
some of it, uncertainty about its scope, and perhaps doubts about its
validity, were no doubt factors. The breadth of the 1978 decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Elliott,8 as described by Holderman,9 probably both cheered
and unnerved prosecutors. The rash of journal articles concerned with
RICO that have appeared in the last several years almost uniformly
reflects a central concern-how to channel and constrain the broad
sweep of RICO to bring it into line with traditional notions of fairness
and due process, while at the same time maintaining its vitality as an
effective weapon against organized crime.
That the prosecutors have not lived up to the Justice Department's
assurances regarding "nickel and dime cases" seems agreed by the
commentators, and is well-illustrated by Holderman's discussion of
4. See Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
5. See McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: What Threatens Civil
Liberties, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55 (1970) (expansion of Senator McClellan's remarks on Senate
floor, see 116 CONG. REC. 18,939 (1970)).
6. Chief of the Justice Department task force in charge of RICO cases, quoted in Atkinson,
"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the
Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CrIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 (1978).
7. Webb & Turow, RICO Forfeiture in Practice: A Prosecutorial Perspective, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 404 (1983).
8. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Delph v. United States, 439 U.S. 953
(1978).
9. Holderman, Reconciling RICO's Conspiracy and "Group" Enterprise Concepts with
Traditional Conspiracy Doctrine, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1983).
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United States v. Sutherland,0 a 1981 case involving a RICO prosecu-
tion of a municipal court judge who fixed traffic tickets. The com-
mentators' concerns have focused on the construction of the Act's
language by the courts, and the implications of applying the Act to the
various fact patterns selected by prosecutors for RICO treatment."
The dialogue concerning RICO, the courts and the criminal law
has been substantially advanced by the three papers included in this
symposium. Holderman focuses on what is one of the most central and
troubling facets of RICO, its expansion of traditional conspiracy doc-
trine through the new statutory concept of the enterprise. Traditional
conspiracy doctrine required some linkages among conspirators; these
linkages were often described by reference to images of physically
connected objects, such as the chain and the wheel. The enterprise, on
the other hand, had no such reification; indeed, the statutory defini-
tion indicates it can be an individual or a group, a legal or a non-legal
entity. When viewed in the context of an overarching criminal syndi-
cate controlled by the secret ties of a Mafia "family," the notion of
assuming an enterprise of which certain criminal conduct is a part
seems appropriate enough. When, however, such enterprise concepts
are applied to a man and his brother who were involved in arson and
the theft and sale of meat, dairy products, some drugs, an occasional
auto, or whatever else came along, and who dealt with a lot of
different people in the process, the idea that there was a metaphoric
corporate structure that justified the government in invoking RICO
and avoiding traditional multiple conspiracy doctrine seems more
questionable and suspect. 2 Holderman's concern for the consequences
of such a broad reading of RICO is consistent with the views expressed
by Professor Craig Bradley, writing in the Iowa Law Review, who
similarly noted that this expansionist view created problems under the
double jeopardy clause, and extended RICO to cover offenses in
which Congress specifically disclaimed any interest.' 3 Holderman
takes comfort in the post-Elliott cases, and particularly the United
States Supreme Court's first RICO decision in 1981,'14 as they evidence
10. 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); Holderman, supra note
9, at 401-02.
11. For two carefully analyzed discussions of the Act and its language, see Bradley, Racke-
teers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837 (1980); Tarlow,
RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980).
12. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898, 902-03 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Delph v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
13. Bradley, supra note 11, at 854-58.
14. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
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a trend of judicial thinking in the direction of applying to RICO cases
a narrower reading of enterprise conspiracy that more closely resem-
bles traditional conspiracy principles. He applauds this trend. 15
In addition to the problem posed by Holderman as to the proper
interpretation of the enterprise concept and with whom and under
what conditions persons alleged to conspire are rightfully subjected to
RICO prosecutions, there are the further problems of forfeiture as
penalty raised by Webb and Turow. 1 The criminal penalties attach-
ing to a RICO violation are specified in section 1963(a). 1 7 What is
special about these penalties is their provision for in personam forfeit-
ure, a concept that, while not new,' 8 had long since been out of favor
as a criminal sanction.' 9 The motivation for bringing back forfeiture
as a criminal penalty stemmed from heightened congressional concern
about the seemingly unchecked spread of organized crime, 20 and the
concomitant desire to punish and deter offenders. Simultaneously,
Congress wanted to break the economic stranglehold in legitimate
businesses that could be gained by organized crime through the use of
illegitimate means to influence or take over such businesses.
2
'
There is little doubt that the forfeiture provision provided prosecu-
tors with an unusually attractive sanction to combat the problem of
organized crime infiltrating legitimate business. Yet the relative
uniqueness of forfeiture as a criminal penalty coupled with the lack of
clarity in the statute as to its potential reach resulted, until very
recently, in disuse of the provision.22 With its increased use, however,
15. Holderman, supra note 9, at 393-403.
16. Webb & Turow, supra note 7.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976). This section provides that
[w]hoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the
United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section
1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right
of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has estab-
lished, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation
of section 1962.
Id.
18. In the common law of England,
[t]he convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated to his
lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all his property, real and personal, to the Crown.
. . . The basis for these forfeitures was that a breach of the criminal law was an offense
to the King's peace, which was felt to justify denial of the right to own property.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (197,f).
19. See Tarlow, supra note 11, at 278.
20. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (statement
of findings and purpose).
21. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
22. See Webb & Turow, supra note 7, at 406.
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have come more questions about legislative intent and proper statu-
tory interpretation. It is to these issues that Webb and Turow address
their insightful and provocative remarks.2 3 In lay terms, the authors
identify the central issues as concerning what is forfeitable, when, and
what does the government have to do to obtain it. In legal terms, the
controversies center on the reach of the forfeiture provision, the time
at which it attaches, and the extent of government responsibility to
trace the forfeited property from the agreed-upon time of forfeiture to
the date that judgment enters.2 4
In assessing the reach of the forfeiture provision, Webb and Turow
point to their investigation of corruption at the Cook County Board of
Appeals as exemplifying the problem of discerning whether the fruits
and profits of racketeering are properly included in the forfeiture.2 5 In
the authors' view, the extent'of the bribery and mail fraud violations
constituted a pattern of racketeering appropriate for a RICO prosecu-
tion. The problem of reach followed from the fact that some of the
defendants were lawyers whose interests from the racketeering activi-
ties were intertwined with the corporate interests of law firms. Divest-
ing a defendant of his interest in the law firm did not clearly preclude
him from either recovering the profits of his racketeering or continu-
ing to enjoy the fruits of those profits, directly or indirectly, should the
remaining corporate shareholders decide to distribute those fruits and
profits to the defendant. If the defendant profited from his racketeer-
ing, now or in the future, the intention of the forfeiture provision to
punish and deter would be clearly thwarted. Moreover, the potential
of the racketeer to influence and benefit the activities of the legitimate
business would not be precluded. Despite the successful RICO prose-
cution, the intended consequences of the Act would not ensue.
In search of support for what Webb and Turow believe to be the
logical statutory interpretation consistent with legislative intent-that
the forfeiture provision does reach the fruits and profits of the racke-
teering activities-the extant case law, legislative history and Justice
Department policy statements are reviewed. 2 Despite the thoughtful
review, it is clear that the vague language of the statute has allowed
for a variety of interpretations. The authors look to the pending
Supreme Court case of Russello v. United States to provide guidance,
while holding fast to their conviction that the forfeiture provision is
23. Id. at 407-409.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 409-11.
26. Id. at 410-18.
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meant to reach the monetary proceeds of racketeering activity. 27 It
makes little sense to believe otherwise.
Congress has not been deaf to the need for clarification. Perhaps in
an attempt to anticipate the Supreme Court, or to make certain that
the right result is reached, regardless of the Supreme Court's holding
in Russello,25 Title IV of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
198329 proposes to amend the RICO forfeiture provision. The signifi-
cant proposed change relevant to the question of reach is that the
proposed language makes it clear that property which constitutes, or
is derived from the proceeds of racketeering activity punishable under
18 U.S.C. § 1962, is subject to an order of criminal forfeiture.30 The
Supreme Court's decision in Russello, or congressional action on the
27. See 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 721 (1983). Webb & Turow,
supra note 7, at 416-18.
28. Russello v. United States, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 721
(1983).
29. S. 829, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2151, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (submitted
to Congress on March 16, 1983).
30. Id. § 402. Part A of Title IV of the proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983
states in relevant part:
Sec. 402. Section 1963 of title 18 of the United States Code is amended to read as
follows:
§ 1963. Criminal penalties
"(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter-
"(1) shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than
twenty years, or both; and
"(2) shall forfeit to the United States any property, irrespective of any provi-
sion of State law-
"(A) constituting, or derived from, any interest in or contribution to an
enterprise the person has acquired, maintained, established, operated, con-
trolled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962
of this chapter;
"(B) constituting a means by which the person has exerted influence or control
over any enterprise he has acquired, maintained, established, operated, con-
trolled, conducted, or participated in the acquisition, maintenance, establish-
ment, operation, conduct or control of, in violation of section 1962 of this
chapter; and
"(C) constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in
violation of section 1962 of this chapter.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to any other
sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that the person forfeit to the United States all
property described in paragraph (2).
"(b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes-
"(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land,
and
"(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges,
interests, claims, and securities.
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proposed amendment to RICO, may soon resolve this issue. As do
Webb and Turow, we believe that the statute either will be construed
to be consistent with its intended purpose, or will be amended to
achieve the same.
The question surrounding the time at which the forfeiture takes
effect was similarly raised by the Office of the United States Attorney
regarding prosecutions of RICO in the Northern District of Illinois. 31
Webb and Turow's review of forfeiture law leads them to conclude
that forfeiture attaches at the time of the offense. Again, in response
to pressure for clarity, Title IV of the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1983 proposes new language to amend the existing statute. In
an attempt to address the problem of defendants defeating the pur-
pose of forfeiture by removing, concealing, divesting or transferring
forfeitable assets some time after the offense but before conviction,
subsection (c) of section 1963 is proposed to be changed so as to be in
accord with the "taint" theory long recognized in forfeiture cases.32
Under this theory, forfeiture attaches to the time when the illegal acts
give rise to the forfeiture. "From that time forward, the property is
tainted and remains subject to forfeiture regardless of any subsequent
disposition. ' 3 Moreover, the proposed amended statute provides new
language specifying that where forfeitable property has been re-
moved, concealed, transferred, commingled with other property, or
substantially depleted in value, the court is empowered to order that
the defendant forfeit substitute assets.3 4
Whether the Congress will pass the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1983, whether the proposed amendments and additions will be
included and whether the courts will interpret this new statutory
language in accordance with the new legislative history remains to be
seen. What does seem clear is that Congress is aware of the limits of
the present statute, in its construction and application, and is taking
steps to reduce the controversies.
The above efforts notwithstanding, the application of RICO and
the use of the forfeiture penalty for RICO offenders are not likely to
meet with universal approval. As a derivative of conspiracy theory,
31. See, e.g., United States v. Jay witt, No. 81 CR 481 (N.D. I11. filed Aug. 5, 1981); United
States v. Morton Hauslinger, No. 81 CR 479 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 3, 1981).
32. Department of Justice, Section-by-Section Summary of Proposed Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1983 130 (1983) (mimeo; summary provided by the United States Department of
Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, April 7, 1983).
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also proposed Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S. 829, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 403 (1983); H.R. 2151, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1983).
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the Act provides for the punishment of group activity over and above
individual criminal acts. As such, it is subject to the same sorts of
criticism that historically have been levied against conspiracy law. 35
To the extent that new definitions of conspiracy groups are imposed,
and new targets beyond those for whom the law was first conceived
are incorporated under these new definitions, we can expect even
more debate and criticism of the kind which is evidenced in the
articles by Holderman, 3 Bradley37 and Tarlow.3 8 Furthermore, to the
extent that corporate defendants are involved in these RICO conspira-
cies, the plethora of complicating issues discussed in detail and with
great insight by Brickey39 will have to be rethought and resolved.
Finally, while the Supreme Court or Congress may give guidance to
some of the statutory language presently lacking clarity, we can ex-
pect that the future will still hold much room for debate on questions
of due process, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment and
selective prosecution as they relate to RICO. The full message of
RICO has not yet been heard.
35. See P. MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CONSPIRACY CASES ch. 10 (1978); Bradley,
supra note 11, at 876; Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189,
197-98 (1972); Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 407-09
(1959).
36. Holderman, supra note 9.
37. Bradley, supra note 11.
38. Tarlow, supra note 11.
39. Brickey, Conspiracy, Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REV.
431 (1983).
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